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A Question of ಫLegitimate Prideಬ? 
The 38th (Welsh) Division at the Battle of Mametz Wood, July 1916 
 
I do not think that there is any Division which fought under my 
command in France which cannot point to at least one occasion when 
its actions reached the highest level of soldierly achievement. Those 
who read … this book may find several occasions, but two come 
immediately to my mind. The one is the attack north of Ypres on the 
31st July, 1917, when the 38th (Welsh) division met and broke to pieces 
a German Guard Division. 
The other is that of the operation against Pozieres on the 21st-24th 
August 1918 – a most brilliant operation alike in conception and 
execution … 
To both occasions, all who fought with the 38th Division can look back 
with legitimate pride. 
Field Marshall Earl Haig, ‘Introduction’, to J. E. Munby (ed.), A History 
of the 38th (Welsh) Division (London, 1920) 
 
By his failure to mention the performance of 38th (Welsh) Division at the battle 
of Mametz Wood (7-12 July 1916) Douglas Haig, the Commander-in-Chief of 
the British Expeditionary Force [henceforth BEF] (1915-18) signalled his 
negative assessment of the Division’s contribution to his Somme offensive. 
Moreover, his opening sentence damned with faint praise the Division’s entire 
wartime record. Alternative perspectives – from participants in the battle and 
 2 
from later generations of scholars – have challenged Haig’s evaluation. 
Historians of Wales have championed the 38th’s cause, seeking to contradict 
its detractors at every turn. Yet troubling assessments by British military 
historians of the 38th’s record demand careful evaluation rather than 
impassioned dismissal. 
 
This essay initially summarizes the battle of Mametz Wood, before outlining 
the historical debates that it has inspired. A wider body of Welsh cultural 
responses to Mametz has been influential in popular understandings of the 
action, intersecting with some dominant narratives in the Welsh historiography 
of the war in general. In order to contextualize both the failings and 
achievements of the Welsh Division at Mametz it is helpful to draw on recent 
work focusing on the British, French and German armies’ experiences on the 
Western Front, which enable a robust but fair assessment of the 38th’s combat 
performance. Such a re-evaluation of the battle of Mametz Wood may 
facilitate a more comprehensive appreciation of the Division’s wartime 
achievements, as well as opportunities for the record of other Welsh 
formations to receive appropriate attention and scrutiny. 
 
The 38th (Welsh) Division sailed for France on 29 November 1915 and went 
into the trenches in January 1916.1 It consisted of approximately 20,000 men 
                                            
1
 This account of the history of 38th Division is based substantially on J. E. 
Munby (ed.), A History of the 38th (Welsh) Division (London, 1920) and Colin 
Hughes, Mametz: Lloyd George’s ‘Welsh Army’ at the Battle of the Somme 
(Guildford, 1990). 
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organized into three brigades (113, 114, 115), each of four infantry battalions. 
It was a ‘New Army’ division (in the Fifth New Army) comprised largely of 
volunteers with a sprinkling of regular and territorial army officers and non-
commissioned-officers and some specialist units. Most of the battalions had, 
at least nominally, the kind of local attachments and identities that 
characterized the archetypal ‘pals’’ battalions raised in response to Lord 
Kitchener’s original call.2 Initially the intention had been to form a Welsh Army 
Corps of two divisions, but owing to the facts that many Welsh volunteers had 
already found their way into other units and that the supply of recruits began 
to dry up early in 1915, it was decided to settle for a single division.3 
 
113 Brigade was comprised of 13th (1st North Wales), 14th (Carnarvon and 
Anglesey), 15th (London Welsh) and 16th battalions of the Royal Welsh 
Fusiliers [henceforth RWF]. 114 Brigade included 10th (1st Rhondda), 13th (2nd 
Rhondda), 14th (Swansea) and 15th (Carmarthenshire) battalions of the Welsh 
Regiment, and 115 Brigade 10th (1st Gwent) and 11th (2nd Gwent) battalions of 
the South Wales Borderers [henceforth SWB], plus 16th (Cardiff City) Welsh 
and 17th (2nd North Wales) RWF. The Division was commanded by Major-
General Sir Ivor Philipps, a regular soldier serving in Burma and India until his 
                                            
2
 The composition of ‘Welsh’ battalions could vary considerably. See Chris 
Williams, ‘Taffs in the trenches: Welsh national identity and military service, 
1914-1918’, in Matthew Cragoe and Chris Williams (eds), Wales and War: 
Society, Politics and Religion in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries 
(Cardiff, 2007), pp. 126-64. 
3
 Munby, History of the 38th, p. 2. 
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retirement in 1903, after which he joined the Pembroke Yeomanry, 
commanding it from 1908 until 1912.4 Liberal MP for Southampton from 1906 
and a prominent company director, he was recalled to military duties in 1914 
and given command of a brigade. In January 1915 he was promoted to his 
divisional command, largely at the behest of David Lloyd George, and as part 
of an arrangement that saw Lloyd George’s second son Gwilym become 
Philipps’s aide-de-camp. Philipps’s promotion was not regarded favourably by 
many regular officers, who felt it unmerited, and neither Lieutenant-General 
Sir Richard Haking of XI Corps, nor Lieutenant-General Henry Horne of XV 
Corps had confidence in him.5 Such negative views were shared by some of 
those who served under Philipps.6 As for his division, the War Office’s 
                                            
4
 See Colin Hughes, ‘Philipps, Sir Ivor (1861-1940), Oxford Dictionary of 
National Biography (hereafter ODNB) (Oxford, 2004) and George A. Jones, 
‘Sir Ivor Philipps’, in Dictionary of Business Biography, Volume 4 (M-R) 
(London, 1985), pp. 659-62. 
5
 The 38th served with XI Corps from December 1915 until June 1916 and was 
transferred to XV Corps in July 1916. Andy Simpson, ‘Haking, Sir Richard 
Cyril Burne (1862-1945)’, ODNB (Oxford, 2004); F. B. Maurice, ‘Horne, Henry 
Sinclair, Baron Horne (1861-1929)’, rev. J. M. Bourne, ODNB (Oxford, 2004); 
Simon Robbins, British Generalship during the Great War: The Military Career 
of Sir Henry Horne (1861-1929) (Aldershot, 2010); Don Farr, The Silent 
General: Horne of the First Army (Solihull, 2009). 
6
 For the views of Brigadier-General Horatio Evans, see David H. Williams, 
‘Letters from the front: ninety years on’, Radnorshire Society Transactions 
(2006), pp. 32-65. 
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judgement when the 38th was despatched to France was that it was ‘a little 
behind other Divisions … in the matter of efficiency’, but that ‘conditions at the 
front will admit of further training being given without inconvenience.’7 
 
Until June 1916 the 38th was employed holding trenches near Neuve 
Chapelle, west of Lille. It suffered casualties from shelling, sniping and 
involvement in trench raids, but mostly this was a quiet time during which no 
major offensives were launched by either side. Ideally, such an inexperienced 
New Army division would not have been blooded in a major battle until 1917. 
This might have permitted the officers and other ranks of the Division to have 
matured as seasoned soldiers and for the British Army’s offensive tactics (so 
badly exposed during the battle of Loos in 1915) to have developed greater 
sophistication and consistency. However, the German attack on the French at 
Verdun from February 1916 forced Haig to commit to his offensive at the 
Somme. 
 
1 July 1916, the opening day of the Somme offensive, remains enormously 
controversial.8 Notwithstanding a prolonged artillery bombardment of German 
                                            
7
 London, The National Archives WO95/2540 – 38th (Welsh) Division War 
Diary, Precis Report No. 117: ‘Training of 38th Division – December 1915 and 
September 1916’, cited by Mark Nicholas Cook, ‘Evaluating the learning 
curve: The 38th (Welsh) division on the Western Front, 1916-1918’ 
(unpublished M.Phil. thesis, University of Birmingham, 2005), 212. 
8
 The literature is extensive on 1 July and the following months. See 
especially A. H. Farrar-Hockley, The Somme (London, 1964), Martin Gilbert, 
 6 
positions on an unprecedented scale, the much-anticipated British 
breakthrough failed to materialize. In many sectors of the front no ground was 
won at all, but casualties were staggering: over 57,000 including more than 
19,000 dead. Only south of the Albert-Bapaume road were significant 
advances made with relatively low loss of life. [FIGURE ONE NEAR HERE] 
Here, the villages of Mametz and Montauban were taken on 1 July and 
Fricourt was abandoned by the Germans the following day. The British line 
moved forward significantly, allowing High Command to contemplate possibly 
                                                                                                                             
Somme: The Heroism and Horror of War (London, 2006), Peter Hart, The 
Somme (London, 2005), Chris McCarthy, The Somme: The Day-by-Day 
Account (London, 1993), William Philpott, Bloody Victory: The Sacrifice on the 
Somme (London, 2010), Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson, The Somme (New 
Haven and London, 2005) and Gary Sheffield, The Somme (London, 2003). 
First-hand testimonies from British and Dominion troops form the core of 
Malcolm Brown, The Imperial War Museum Book of the Somme (London, 
1997), Lyn Macdonald, Somme (London, 1984) and Martin Middlebrook, The 
First Day on the Somme: 1 July 1916 (London, 1984). Some German 
perspectives are found in Christopher Duffy, Through German Eyes: The 
British and the Somme 1916 (London, 2007), Jack Sheldon, The German 
Army on the Somme, 1914-1916 (Barnsley, 2006) and G. C. Wynne, 
Landrecies to Cambrai: Case Studies of German Offensive and Defensive 
Operations on the Western Front, 1914-17 (Solihull, 2013). The relevant 
volume of official history is Wilfrid Miles, History of the Great War based on 
official documents: Military Operations, France and Belgium, 1916 – 2nd July 
1916 to the end of the Battles of the Somme (London, 1938). 
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piercing the German second line situated along the Bazentin ridge. Haig 
believed that, as a preliminary, British troops would need to secure most of 
the intervening territory, including German-held positions in Contalmaison, 
Trônes Wood and Mametz Wood. 38th Division, kept in reserve during the 
opening of the Somme offensive, was charged with taking Mametz Wood. 
 
By the time the 38th was deployed British lines had moved north as far as 
Quadrangle Trench to the west of the wood, the ridge running immediately 
south and south-east of the wood, and Caterpillar Wood directly to the east. 
[FIGURE TWO NEAR HERE] The 38th had responsibility for all areas to the 
east of the southernmost projection of Mametz Wood, with 17th (Northern) 
Division, commanded by Major-General Pilcher, holding the line to the west.9 
The attack on Mametz Wood, designed for Friday 7 July, was to be two-
pronged, with the 17th attempting to take Quadrangle Support Trench, Acid 
Drop Copse and other positions on the wood’s west side, as well, possibly, as 
its south-western corner. The 38th would launch a brigade-strength attack on 
the prominent ‘Hammerhead’ feature on the eastern flank of the wood. 
 
Repeated attacks by the 17th on Quadrangle Support Trench (eight between 7 
and 10 July) failed with heavy losses. Troops were asked to make frontal 
assaults across open ground on an enemy trench both ends of which were 
secure and which offered the Germans the opportunity to lay down enfilading 
machine-gun and small arms fire on attackers. It was only once Mametz 
                                            
9
 A. Hilliard Atteridge, History of the 17th (Northern) Division (Glasgow, 1929). 
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Wood began to be taken on 10 July that German positions to its west were 
rendered untenable and abandoned.10 
 
As for the 38th’s assault on 7 July, this was allotted to 115 Brigade, and 
particularly to 16th Welsh and 11th SWB, with 10th SWB in support.11 These 
battalions were ordered to emerge from Caterpillar Valley across open 
country to launch themselves at the Hammerhead. The assault took place in 
daylight (at 0830) showing little recognition that the Germans had machine 
guns both in the wood and in Flat Iron and Sabot copses to the north, as well 
as along the German second line further up the ridge. The attack was 
preceded by a forty-minute artillery bombardment but no smoke screen which 
might have offered the attackers some measure of invisibility was 
forthcoming.12 Requests made by 115’s Brigadier-General Horatio Evans to 
                                            
10
 The formidable challenge presented by Quadrangle Support Trench is 
recognised in Arthur Conan Doyle, The British Campaign in France and 
Flanders: 1916 (London, 1918), pp. 118, 122-3. 
11
 Munby, History of the 38th, incorrectly suggests (p. 17) that it was 10th SWB 
that participated in the first attack, an error which has been repeated 
elsewhere (such as Thomas O. Marden, The History of the Welch Regiment: 
Part II – 1914-1918 (Cardiff, 1932). 
12
 According to C. T. Atkinson, The History of the South Wales Borderers 
1914-1918 (London, 1931), p. 242, the artillery bombardment ‘had been 
neither sufficiently accurate nor effective’. 
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attack at daybreak and take control of artillery support were dismissed.13 
Consequently, as soon as the men of 16th Welsh and 11th SWB came within 
sight of German machine guns they were cut down. According to Marden, 
‘machine guns smote them hip and thigh … the enemy concentrated their fire 
on the successive waves, as they came over the crest, and annihilated them 
in turn.’14 Although estimations of distance vary, the closest Welsh troops got 
was likely about 250 yards from the Hammerhead where they were pinned 
down in the open, sniped, mortared and shelled.15 
 
Following another brief artillery bombardment a second attempt was made to 
renew the attack at 1015 but this was stopped in its tracks. 10th SWB was 
brought up and a third attempt made at 1515 but no improvement was 
forthcoming, and its commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Wilkinson, killed. 
Orders to launch a fourth attack at 1700 were contested by Brigadier-General 
                                            
13
 Llewelyn Wyn Griffith, Up To Mametz (London, 1931), p. 194; Marden, 
Welch Regiment, p. 382. 
14
 Marden, Welch Regiment, p. 383. 
15
 Munby’s claim (History of the 38th, p. 17) that the battalions ‘just failed to 
reach the wood’ is over-generous. Sergeant Arthur Perriman of 11th SWB in a 
memoir written in 1976 suggested that troops got to within 50 yards of the 
wood before the Germans opened fire, but that is not supported by other 
accounts, such as that of Victor Lansdown of 16th Welsh, who estimated the 
distance as between 400 and 500 yards (London, Imperial War Museum 
(hereafter IWM) IWM 4860, Private Papers of Arthur E. Perriman; IWM 10147, 
Interview with Victor George Lansdown). 
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Evans and the troops were instead permitted to withdraw. The first major 
attack of the war by the Welsh Division had ended in disappointment and 
slaughter.16 
 
A further attack with 14th RWF in the van was ordered for the night of 8/9 July, 
but the difficulties of getting to the starting position through waterlogged, 
heavily congested trenches led to its cancellation.17 This was the final straw 
for Philipps’s superiors, and he was sacked on 9 July. Replacing him on a 
temporary basis was Major-General Herbert Edward Watts, who had been 
commanding 7th Division and knew the area well. Watts had utilized the 
innovative tactic of a creeping artillery barrage to provide his troops with 
protection during earlier advances which had taken the villages of Mametz 
and Fricourt. Trusted sufficiently by XV Corps to be allowed to execute his 
own plan of attack, he arrived at divisional headquarters on 9 July and issued 
orders for an assault to take place at first light the following morning.18 Two 
                                            
16
 For Marden, Welch Regiment, p. 384, it had been a ‘disastrous action’. For 
Farr, Silent General, p. 100, 7th July was ‘a day of almost total failure for XV 
Corps’. 
17
 C. H. Dudley Ward, Regimental Records of the Royal Welch Fusiliers, 
Volume III -1914-1918 – France and Flanders (Uckfield, 2005), p. 204. 
18
 Robin Barlow’s observation (Wales and World War One (Llandysul, 2014), 
p. 72) that Watts was ‘a man with no knowledge or understanding of the 
Welsh men he was to lead’ ignores the fact that his 7th Division included 1st 
RWF. Haig viewed Watts as ‘a distinctly stupid man’, but also ‘a hard fighter, 
leader of men [who] inspires confidence in all above and below’. Andy 
 11 
battalions each from both 113 and 114 Brigades were to advance against the 
south-eastern edge of the wood at 0415, the attack preceded by a lifting 
artillery barrage designed to catch the German defenders as they emerged 
from their underground defences and dug-outs to take their positions in 
forward trenches. A smoke-screen would give the Welsh troops some cover, 
partially negating the risk of enfilading fire from the Hammerhead. Once in the 
wood it was envisaged that they would advance steadily behind a rolling 
barrage timed to move forwards 50 yards per minute. If executed to the letter 
the plan would see the wood captured by 0815. 
 
The attack went in more or less on time. Although 16th and 14th RWF on the 
left had a shorter distance to travel on the left than 14th Welsh in the centre 
and 13th Welsh on the right (who were most exposed to machine-guns in the 
Hammerhead as they crossed 750 yards of open field) the RWF battalions 
needed reinforcement by 15th RWF following some loss of momentum, and 
10th Welsh was sent in between the RWF battalions and 14th Welsh. Entry to 
the wood was achieved in conditions of savage hand-to-hand (‘tree-to-tree’) 
fighting, although some German counter-attacks drove Welsh troops back into 
the open at least once before the Welsh reasserted themselves. Despite 
heavy loss of life among officers, often targets for German snipers, the first 
cross-ride was reached on schedule. But whatever the logic and precision of 
the original plan, the reality of the fighting was very different. 
                                                                                                                             
Simpson, ‘British corps command on the Western Front, 1914-1918’, in Gary 
Sheffield and Dan Todman (eds), Command and Control on the Western 
Front: The British Army’s Experience, 1918-1918 (Staplehurst, 2004), p. 109. 
 12 
 
Mametz Wood was a cultivated wood of hornbeams, limes, willows, oaks and 
beeches, bramble and hazel bushes, with distinct cross-rides and paths. Two 
years of neglect had rendered it thick with dense undergrowth in parts. 
Artillery fire had brought down many trees - ‘a formidable barrier’ according to 
Wyn Griffith - making rapid progress impossible and the terrain a defender’s 
dream.19 In such conditions it was extremely difficult to maintain control over 
troops. Visibility was very restricted, many officers (the only ones with 
compasses) had become casualties in the initial assault, and it was no easy 
matter for troops to work out in which direction they should be heading or 
where the enemy might be hiding.20 Telephone lines were easily cut and 
communications became reliant on runners, themselves often caught in 
artillery barrages. Soldiers from different units became jumbled together, there 
were casualties from artillery and small-arms ‘friendly fire’ and a shortage of 
fresh water became critical during a day when the temperature reached 82 
degrees Fahrenheit.21 
                                            
19
 Bangor, Bangor University, Archives and Special Collections, Papers of 
Major W. P. Wheldon, 1916-1919, BMSS/39617: ‘Notes on Mametz Wood 
obtained by Patrol, 2nd Battn. Royal Irish Regiment, on night shift 3/4th July’; 
Griffith, Up To Mametz, p. 209. 
20
 Marden, Welch Regiment, p. 389. 
21
 McCarthy, Somme, pp. 43-4. These difficulties were not confined to British 
troops: see Jonathan Hicks, The Welsh at Mametz Wood: The Somme 1916 
(Talybont, 2016), p. 303, citing Gefreiter Erich Berndt’s testimony that ‘next to 
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Nevertheless, more battalions were fed into the wood and the German 
defenders were steadily driven back. Batches of the enemy surrendered, 
others fought tenaciously.22 The wood was speckled with German 
entrenchments and dugouts and easily reinforced from the German second 
line to the north. By early evening some Welsh units were within grenade-
throwing distance of the wood’s northern edge, but the Germans were 
hanging on, still launching counter-attacks. The risk of Welsh troops being 
outflanked or surrounded as night fell prompted withdrawal to a perimeter 
straddling the second cross-ride. During the night 16th Welsh and 11th SWB, 
still licking their wounds from 7 July, came into the front line, and on 11 July 
efforts continued to clear the wood. By now the troops were increasingly 
exhausted, the confused dispositions in the wood made it very difficult to use 
artillery support, and further heavy casualties were suffered when British 
shells dropped short or, on a low trajectory, hit treetops and exploded. 11th 
SWB got to the north-eastern corner of the wood but were forced to retire 
                                                                                                                             
hunger, thirst tormented us the most. There was no drinking water in Mametz 
Wood.’ 
22
 Press accounts are vivid: Western Mail, 15, 18 July 1916; Cambria Daily 
Leader, 11 October 1918; G. J., ‘Some of the Royal Welsh’, Welsh Outlook, 
April 1918. They may be supplemented by testimonies including those of 
Frank Richards, Old Soldiers Never Die (Sleaford, 1994), p. 181; Robert 
Graves, Good-Bye To All That: An Autobiography (Oxford, 1995), pp. 187, 
189; and Gerald Brenan, ‘A Survivor’s Story’, in George A. Panichas (ed.), 
Promise of Greatness: The War of 1914-1918 (London, 1968), p. 45. 
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owing to insufficient support on their flanks. Nonetheless, during the night of 
11/12 July the Germans withdrew from their remaining positions. On 
Wednesday 12 July, with Mametz Wood in British hands, 38th (Welsh) 
Division was relieved by 7th and 21st Divisions. The battle was over, and, as 
far as the 38th was concerned, so was the Somme offensive. Transferred to 
VIII Corps, in August it moved to the Ypres salient, and would not take part in 
another large-scale assault for over a year.23 
 
Reactions to the 38th’s experiences at Mametz were initially negative. 
Lieutenant Apps of 11th SWB, who had taken part in the attack on 7 July, 
wrote in his diary on 11th that ‘[t]hings are going badly in the battle for the 
wood’, and on 12th, when the battalion emerged, he commented ‘[t]hey have 
had a very rough time.’24 Captain Dunn of 2nd RWF on the same day passed 
‘the transport of the Welsh Division coming out after the mauling at Mametz 
Wood’, and two days later ‘went exploring in Mametz Wood, where the Welsh 
Division was so mishandled’.25 Also on 14 July Lieutenant-Colonel Lloyd 
Williams of 9th RWF noted he learned of ‘the disaster’.26 Siegfried Sassoon 
(who served with both 1st and 2nd RWF) referred in his memoirs to the 
‘victimization’ of the 38th, it being involved in ‘massacre and confusion’, 
                                            
23
 Munby, History of the 38th, pp. 19-20. 
24
 IWM, Private Papers of Lieutenant H. E. Apps – 7414/76/216/1. 
25
 J. C. Dunn, The War the Infantry Knew 1914-1919 (London, 1994), pp. 223, 
226. 
26
 IWM, Private Papers of Lt.-Col. H. Lloyd Williams DSO MC, ‘Personal 
Experiences during the years of the European War (1914/1918)’, p. 43. 
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‘pandemonium’ and ‘a disastrous muddle, with troops stampeding under 
machine-gun fire’.27 And divisional staff officer Colonel Drake-Brockman wrote 
in 1930 that it was ‘common talk in the British Expeditionary Force that 38th 
Division had “bolted”’.28 
 
If reactions from those in or close to the Division were largely of horror, 
unambiguous disappointment was expressed by senior commanders. Haig, in 
his diary entry for 9 July reflecting on the first assault on 7th, stated that: 
 
… although the wood had been most adequately bombarded the 
division never entered the wood, and in the whole division the total 
casualties for the 24 hours are under 150! A few bold men entered the 
wood and found little opposition. Deserters also stated Enemy was 
greatly demoralised and had very few troops on the ground.29 
                                            
27
 Sassoon, Memoirs of an Infantry Officer (London, 1965), pp. 61-3. Sassoon 
referred to the 14th RWF as ‘unseasoned’, ‘mostly undersized men’, ‘a jostling 
company of exclamatory Welshmen’, ‘a forlorn crowd of khaki figures’, 
‘doomed … half trained civilians’, whom another officer would have termed ‘a 
panicky rabble’. The journal entry made at the time is non-pejorative – see 
Cambridge University, Cambridge Digital Archive, Siegfried Sassoon’s 
Journal, folio 44, 6 July 1916. 
28
 See Renshaw, Mametz Wood, p. 132. Drake-Brockman was neither an 
entirely reliable nor an objective witness. 
29
 Douglas Haig, War Diaries and Letters, 1914-1918, ed. Gary Sheffield and 
John Bourne (London, 2006), p. 201. 
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Haig was misinformed: no troops entered the wood, the Germans held it in 
strength, and deaths among the attacking battalions amounted to 182, total 
casualties to 511. But Somme mud stuck. Commanding Fourth Army, 
Rawlinson wrote on 14 July to Chief of the Imperial General Staff Lieutenant-
General Sir William Robertson that ‘only one Division, the 38th (Welshmen) 
turned out badly’, adding ‘if it had not been for their failure at Mametz Wood 
we would have brought off the action of today [the attack on Bazentin Ridge] 
at least 48 hours sooner.’30 He reiterated this point to Lord Derby on 1 August, 
noting that ‘it makes me very sick to think of the “might have beens”’.31 
 
Such a ‘for the want of a nail’ argument was explicitly emphasized by Haig’s 
private secretary Lieutenant-Colonel Boraston, who erected an elaborate 
superstructure shortly after the war on Rawlinson’s and Haig’s laments that 
their grand plans for the Somme offensive had not materialized, all 
attributable to the delay in taking Mametz Wood. He observed: 
 
Our failure to secure Mametz Wood at an earlier date had an important 
influence on the course of the battle. The days lost here were of the 
greatest value to the enemy. They gave him the opportunity he needed 
                                            
30
 Cited in Farr, Silent General, p. 106. 
31
 Cited in Tim Travers, The Killing Ground: The British Army, the Western 
Front and the Emergence of Modern Warfare (Barnsley, 2003), p. 170. 
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to restore order among his defeated battalions, to bring up fresh troops 
and to reorganise his defences.32 
 
Later he returned to this theme: ‘insistence upon the correct policy to pursue 
cannot wholly avoid mistakes in its application … [such as] in the direction of 
a too ready discouragement, such as was responsible for hanging up the 
attack on Mametz Wood … .’33 
 
The official history echoed such criticism with its comment that ‘the half-
hearted British attacks from the 7th onwards induced the German to organize 
a strong resistance’ (in Mametz Wood).34 Although such negativity about the 
38th’s performance was not universal, it took more than six decades after July 
1916 for the cloud cast over its reputation by what might be called the 
‘disgrace narrative’ to begin to disperse.35 
 
                                            
32
 Boraston, Sir Douglas Haig’s Command (London, 1922), pp. 113-14. 
Boraston’s focus was on 7 July. 
33
 Ibid., p. 349. 
34
 Miles, History of the Great War, p. 51. 
35
 Conan Doyle, British Campaign, pp. 130-1, wrote that the 38th’s action had 
involved ‘nothing but the most devoted valour upon the part of the assailants’. 
Eddie Williams, a Captain in 16th Welsh in 1916, argued in letters to the 
Western Mail (28 November 1942, 4 June 1943) that the 38th had not been 
given sufficient credit for its achievement in taking the wood. 
 18 
The counter-argument has taken two forms. First, historians of the Somme 
offensive do not now support the suggestion that the 38th’s failure to take 
Mametz Wood on 7 July was critical to the outcome of the overall battle. 
There were missed opportunities between 1 and 7 July, but these were 
spread across the southern battlefield.36 Mametz Wood could potentially have 
been taken as early as 3 July, when there were relatively few Germans in the 
wood, well before the 38th was brought into the front line.37 Apologists for 
British High Command, at least in this period, have been rebutted, Peter Hart 
writing of a ‘collective failure of generalship within the Fourth Army [that] can 
never be adequately explained or excused’, and blaming Rawlinson for ‘an 
abrogation of clear responsibility to personally oversee the performance of 
command tasks.’38 The ‘want of a nail’ argument is no longer seen as valid, 
even by those historians who might still find the 38th’s performance at Mametz 
Wood deficient. 
 
Second, a more thorough and sympathetic assessment of the 38th’s 1916 
history was made possible by the publication in 1982 of Colin Hughes’s 
Mametz: Lloyd George’s ‘Welsh Army’ at the Battle of the Somme. This was 
praised as ‘a major step forward’ which ‘truly heralded the advent of a new, 
scholarly, archive-based approach to the study of the First World War’, and 
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which remains the single most authoritative volume on the battle.39 Hughes’s 
achievement was to consider in detail the 38th’s experiences alongside a 
critical assessment of the Division’s handling by XV Corps, Fourth Army and 
by Haig himself. Hughes tackled directly the ‘extreme arguments’ levelled at 
the 38th by Boraston and others, which he judged ‘a grave injustice’ that could 
be ‘easily demolished’.40 And his overall verdict on the 38th’s performance at 
Mametz Wood was clear: ‘there can be no doubting now the magnitude of 
their achievement’.41 
 
Hughes’s revisionism has been followed by others who have not departed 
significantly from his findings. Michael Renshaw’s Mametz Wood notes that 
the battle was ‘not entirely a Welsh affair’ given the involvement of both 7th 
and 17th Divisions, but concurs with Hughes in arguing that the 38th, in three 
days of fighting ‘set the standard for this type of combat that was never to be 
surpassed on the Somme battlefields’.42 Jonathan Hicks gathered together 
information about many of those who died in the battle, adding a new level of 
detail in what is a sustained tribute to a ‘citizen force, composed of miners 
from the Rhondda, farmers from Caernarvon and Anglesey, coal trimmers 
from … Barry and Cardiff, bank workers from Swansea’, who ‘fought in 
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savage hand-to-hand fighting with an enemy from the most effective army in 
Europe at that time and drove them out of Mametz Wood’.43 
 
Together, the scholarship of Hughes, Renshaw and Hicks has built on the 
proud if partisan and uneven accounts of regimental and divisional histories to 
provide a substantial ‘redemption narrative’ that has largely contradicted the 
hostile verdicts of the inter-war military establishment and restored a sense of 
Welsh national pride to the 38th’s efforts. In recent years narrative military 
histories of the Somme have absorbed this scholarship sufficiently to revise 
the estimations of the 38th’s performance at Mametz Wood, with (for 
example), William Philpott arguing that ‘the Welsh New Army battalions had 
taken a formidable position in one of the most intense close-quarter fights of 
the war.’44 Such revisionism represents a much fairer assessment of the 38th’s 
experiences on the Somme than the earlier ‘disgrace narrative’. Yet the 
history of the Welsh Division at Mametz Wood continues to raise troubling 
issues, and the remainder of this essay examines three in particular. First, 
there will be a consideration of the extent to which the Mametz battle misleads 
in often appearing to stand proxy for the Welsh experience of the First World 
War. Second, it will be investigated whether comparative assessments of 
British divisions yield uncomfortable findings that cast doubt on the ability of 
the ‘redemption narrative’ to offer closure in respect of the 38th’s performance 
in 1916. Finally, a re-evaluation of the 38th’s Mametz battle draws on recent 
studies of French and German as well as British military history in attempting 
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to arrive at a more impartial appraisal than is currently offered by either the 
‘disgrace’ or ‘redemption’ narratives. 
 
It is arguable that in the public mind at least, works of cultural production have 
been as if not more powerful in constructing an understanding of the Welsh 
experience of the First World War with a Mametz Wood ‘sacrifice narrative’ at 
its heart. This is not the place to analyse the many and varied forms that 
cultural interpretation has taken, but it ranges from visual culture (Christopher 
Williams’s 1917 painting ‘The Charge of the Welsh Division at Mametz Wood’, 
David Petersen’s 1987 Mametz Wood memorial, Aled Rhys Hughes’s twenty-
first century photography and the ‘War’s Hell’ exhibition at Amgueddfa Cymru: 
National Museum Wales in 2016), to performance (1946 and 1955 BBC Radio 
productions and the 2016 Welsh National Opera production of David Jones’s 
In Parenthesis, the National Theatre Wales 2014 production Mametz), to 
literature of various kinds (the poetry of David Jones and Owen Sheers, the 
crime fiction of Jonathan Hicks, and impressive David Jones scholarship by 
Colin Hughes and Thomas Dilworth).45 Television and radio responses have 
clustered around anniversaries, and the centenary of the battle was the 
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occasion for programmes in English and Welsh presented by former Welsh 
rugby international Gareth Thomas, weather forecaster Derek Brockway and 
Welsh national poet Ifor ap Glyn.46 
 
This one battle, such is the iconic cultural position it enjoys, sometimes 
appears to stand proxy for the Welsh experience of the entire conflict, echoed 
in Wyn Griffith’s suggestion that this was a ‘high point of the war where for me 
and so many other Welshmen the tragedy reached its culmination’.47 That this 
remains the case is assisted by the close identification of the battle with 38th 
Division’s efforts alone, and by the fact that the site remains easily identifiable 
and relatively unchanged. It is possible for visitors to imagine Mametz Wood 
in a more coherent and easily translatable manner than, for instance, is the 
case with Pilkem Ridge, the opening day of the Third Battle of Ypres, in which 
the 38th again went ‘over the top’, partly because that was a much larger scale 
offensive and partly because the intervening century has rendered much of 
the Belgian battlefield more resistant to identification and interpretation. 
 
In addition, Mametz Wood can function as a Welsh version of the first day of 
the Somme offensive – as an exemplary tragic narrative which captures the 
attention at the expense, potentially, of a more grounded understanding of the 
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campaign of which it formed a part. For an audience whose grasp of the First 
World War remains profoundly influenced by the tropes of ‘Lions led by 
Donkeys’, ‘Oh! What a Lovely War!’ and Blackadder Goes Forth, it fits neatly 
as an example of the courage of ordinary soldiers, the stupidity of generals, 
and the futility of the war as a whole.48 It does not take much for the ordinary 
soldiers to be primarily identified as Welsh and the stupid generals to be 
primarily identified as English and a nationalist twist is added to an analysis 
already heavily loaded by considerations of social class. Mametz Wood is 
thus freighted with anachronistic meaning: the senseless sacrifice of Welsh 
youth at the hands of the imperial power, careless about squandering the lives 
of a subject people. Such characterisations risk reducing our understanding of 
the war to crude stereotypes, and distorting an historical evaluation of the 
battle on its own terms. More critically, there are fundamental problems with 
privileging Mametz Wood over all other actions in which Welsh troops were 
involved. For the performance of that one division should not act as a 
surrogate for the war-time efforts of all Welsh soldiers. Mametz was not an 
unique test case for Welsh martial valour. 
 
First, the deeds of Welsh soldiers on the Somme or in other theatres of war 
were not confined to the ordeal of the 38th. Twenty-one Welsh infantry and 
seven pioneer battalions saw action on the Somme, and only thirteen of these 
twenty-eight units were in the Welsh Division. The Welsh Guards were in the 
Guards Division, 1st Division contained 1st SWB and 2nd Welsh, 7th Division 1st 
RWF, 19th Division 9th RWF and 9th Welsh and 33rd Division 2nd RWF. Some 
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of these divisions enjoyed recognisably more successful campaigns than 38th. 
2nd RWF in particular had a reputation for aggression, good discipline and 
cohesion.49 Evaluating the wartime record of Welsh soldiers needs to go 
beyond the 38th to include all Welsh units, regular, territorial and New Army, 
and not to forget the contribution of 53rd (Welsh) Division which fought in 
Palestine as well as in France and Flanders. Many Welsh soldiers were found 
in ‘non-Welsh’ units, a point recently reinforced by Ritchie Wood’s micro-
historical analysis of those South Wales miners who served in the Royal 
Engineers, digging tunnels for offensive mining operations, as well as 
repairing roads and bridges.50 
 
Second, the wartime record of the 38th itself did not begin and end at Mametz, 
it going on to enjoy greater success in 1917 and 1918. Peter Simkins 
identifies the 38th as a division which employed ‘skilful small-unit tactics most 
frequently during the “Hundred Days”’, while Gary Sheffield has gone further 
in arguing that, based on its 1918 record, ‘the 38th Welsh Division was in a 
select band of elite divisions’.51 A cautionary note is sounded by Jonathan 
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Boff’s revelation that German intelligence reports as late as October 1918 
viewed the 38th as ‘average’.52 In the most sustained evaluation Mark Cook 
argues that the 38th ‘significantly improved in its fighting ability, performance, 
and efficiency’ from 1916 to 1918.53 Cook’s statistical distillation of the 38th’s 
record in four battles revealed in Table One indicates that of these Mametz 
was clearly the least successful. [TABLE ONE NEAR HERE] 
 
TABLE ONE: 38TH (WELSH) DIVISION CASUALTIES AND GROUND 
GAINED, SELECTED BATTLES, 1914-18 
 CASUALTIES 
(per cent) 
Average Rate of Capture of 
Ground (square yards per day) 
Mametz Wood 1916 17.2 625,000 
Pilckem Ridge 1917 1.9 17,000,000 
Albert 1918 11.3 8,400,000 
Cambrai 1918 17.2 16,500,000 
 
Source: Cook, ‘Evaluating the learning curve’, 229-30. 
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Any bruised Welsh national pride caused by slurs on the determination or 
courage of the 38th at Mametz may also be eased by the unarguable 
observation that the Division (like all Welsh units) was far from being 
ethnically homogeneous. It is true that the New Army battalions of the Welsh 
regiments contained a higher percentage of Welsh-born soldiers (50.4 per 
cent) than regular army units (44.7 per cent), but 47.4 per cent of those in the 
‘Kitchener battalions’ were English-born nonetheless.54 As for the 38th, 
calculations by the present author as well as by Cook (see Table Two) allow 
us to compare the ethnic composition of its composite units both in 1916 and 
across the war as a whole. The figures suggest that a substantial majority of 
troops were Welsh in 1916 - Cook calculates that 68 per cent of the 38th’s 
infantry dead at Mametz were Welsh-born – but that in the course of the entire 
conflict there was significant dilution. [TABLE TWO NEAR HERE].55 Overall, 
the ‘Welsh’ experience of the war clearly neither began nor ended at Mametz 
Wood. 
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TABLE TWO: PERCENTAGE OF DEAD WITH BIRTHPLACES IN WALES, 
INFANTRY BATTALIONS, 38TH (WELSH) DIVISION 
BATTALION MAMETZ WAR 
   
13th RWF 68.8 48.5 
14th RWF 71.1 51.8 
15th RWF 31.4 31.1 
16th RWF 64.8 52.2 
17th RWF 61.4 54.4 
   
10th Welsh 65.0 64.9 
13th Welsh 79.4 61.9 
14th Welsh 85.7 62.2 
15th Welsh 55.2 51.5 
16th Welsh 71.9 63.9 
   
10th SWB 60.6 45.2 
11th SWB 61.1 46.9 
   
 
Sources: Column on ‘Mametz’: Cook, ‘Evaluating the learning curve’, 215. 
Column on ‘War’: Williams, ‘Taffs in the trenches’, pp. 143-4. The total dead 
for whom birthplace data is given is 680 for Mametz and 5283 for the entire 
war. 
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It has already been demonstrated that the ‘redemption narrative’ has refuted 
some of the more partisan slanders aimed by inter-war writers at the Welsh 
Division. However, it is the case that the scholarship associated particularly 
with the military historian Peter Simkins and his colleagues has generated 
additional data of an uncomfortable nature for those concerned to set the 
38th’s achievements in the best possible light. Simkins, along with Bryn 
Hammond, John Lee and Chris McCarthy, initiated the ‘SHLM Battle 
Assessment Study’ in the early 1990s, and although the project was never 
completed, its guiding principles have underpinned some of the most 
innovative scholarship generated on the British Army during the war.56 
Simkins et al. found their interest piqued by the impressionistic evaluations by 
contemporaries of the relative worth and effectiveness of particular divisions 
or of the comparative merits of Dominion or Scottish troops in contrast to 
those in English county regiments.57 They wished to develop a more robust 
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evidential base by which to track what they considered to be improved 
performance by the British on the Western Front over the course of the war, 
improvement that enabled the often-maligned BEF ultimately to triumph over 
their enemies. The argument was that, notwithstanding horrendous failings 
and catastrophic disasters, poor generalship and shoddy staff work, in time 
the British benefited from a ‘learning curve’.58 The strategy, tactics and, 
ultimately, execution of more sophisticated military planning by the BEF 
reached its culmination in the successes of the battle of Amiens in 1918 and 
in the ‘Hundred Days’ offensive that led to the Armistice. 
 
One way of evidencing progress along the ‘learning curve’ was to find ways of 
measuring the ‘battle performance’ or ‘combat effectiveness’ of British troops, 
assessed optimally at divisional level. Simkins carried out a pioneering study 
of British divisions in the ‘Hundred Days’, systematically surveying 966 
attacking operations launched by 60 British and Dominion infantry divisions 
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between 8 August and 11 November 1918.59 He found considerable variation 
in the performance of different divisions, but overall little to sustain the claim 
that Dominion troops were more effective than British units: ‘far from being the 
“bluntest of swords” or a mere supporting cast, the British divisions … actually 
made a very weighty contribution to the Allied victory.’60 Simkins 
supplemented this overall survey of the closing campaign of the war with a 
longitudinal study of one New Army formation, 18th (Eastern) Division.61 
Characterized as ‘ordinary’ (defined as ‘without the elitist selection processes 
of some Territorial units, without the distinct social cohesion of the northern 
Pals formations, and without the sectarian and political binding of the 36th 
(Ulster) Division’), the 18th was sufficiently successful during the Somme 
offensive to be part of the BEF’s ‘assault elite’.62 
 
Although the overly ambitious nature of the SHLM project meant that it failed 
to deliver on its original promises, Simkins’s modified methodology for 
assessing the combat effectiveness of British divisions has continued to 
generate intriguing results. Most relevant for a study of the 38th at Mametz, he 
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assessed the overall performance of New Army divisions on the Somme in 
1916.63 
 
The soldierly achievements of the New Army had been largely downgraded by 
the official historians of the inter-war years, who were primarily concerned to 
uphold the reputation of the original, professional BEF.64 Later scholars have 
occasionally echoed their negative, sometimes patronising judgements.65 
Simkins’s work on 18th Division suggested the picture was more complex, and 
prompted him to undertake a fuller analysis of all 25 New Army divisions on 
the Somme. He considered 281 separate attacks, categorising them on a 
scale from ‘successful’ (sub-divided into five grades, depending on the extent 
to which the assigned objectives were achieved), through ‘limited success 
verging on failure’ to ‘outright failures’.66 Overall, the success rate was 57 per 
cent, ‘limited successes verging on failure’ accounted for 7 per cent and the 
proportion of ‘outright failures’ was 36 per cent, results which confound ‘the 
widely held negative view of the tactical performance of the New Army 
divisions’, which ‘performed at least as well as, and in some cases even better 
than, their Regular counterparts’.67 Table Three summarizes Simkins’s results 
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on a divisional basis: [TABLE THREE NEAR HERE] and aligns them with 
overall casualties for the New Army divisions on the Somme. The latter data 
set shows that only 37th Division suffered fewer casualties than the 38th during 
the entire offensive, so the notion that Welsh troops were in any way 
‘sacrificed’ is clearly unsustainable.68 Furthermore, whatever the problems 
with using statistical measurements of battlefield performance (discussed 
below), the record of the 38th on the Somme, according to Simkins’s 
assessment, was clearly unimpressive, with some success in only two of a 
total of seven offensive operations.69 
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TABLE THREE: SUCCESS RATES AND TOTAL CASUALTIES OF NEW 
ARMY DIVISIONS, SOMME, 1916 
DIVISION SUCCESS RATE (%) CASUALTIES 
41st 100 5928 
11th (Northern) 85.71 8954 
20th (Light) 85.71 6854 
21st 80 13044 
18th (Eastern) 76.92 13323 
19th (Western) 73.33 9830 
39th 71.42 7215 
14th (Light) 70 7643 
16th (Irish) 66.66 4330 
9th (Scottish) 64.28 10538 
12th (Eastern) 63.63 11089 
25th 62.49 11239 
37th 56 2000 
15th (Scottish) 54.54 4877 
23rd 54.16 6282 
32nd 50 5272 
30th 46.15 17374 
34th 45.45 12036 
33rd 41.66 10787 
17th (Northern) 40.9 12613 
24th 38.46 6119 
38th (Welsh) 28.57 3876 
31st 0 5902 
35th (Bantam) 0 4663 
36th (Ulster) 0 5482 
 
Sources: Success Rates: Simkins, From the Somme, pp. 63-5. Casualties: 
Prior and Wilson, Somme, pp. 300-1. 
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The approach adopted by Simkins to measuring the efficiency of British army 
divisions on the Western Front has much to commend it. It brings a 
consistency and an objectivity to an assessment that was previously, as 
Paddy Griffith noted, ‘based upon little more than prejudice, hearsay, and the 
cut of the division commander’s jaw when he turned up at GHQ’.70 
Nonetheless, the flaws in the method are also readily apparent. For ‘success’ 
is measured against the objectives set for the operation, objectives not 
necessarily determined at divisional level. If army or corps command directed 
division to attempt what was an impossible task, then an inability to achieve 
such a task counts, under the Simkins method, as ‘failure’, just as much as an 
inability by division to accomplish what might be considered an attainable 
objective. In the former, no amount of élan would make any difference to the 
eventual outcome, whereas in the latter case it might be a lack of resolve by 
the troops, or competence by their officers, that could be considered 
responsible for their failure. In such cases the ‘combat efficiency’ formula is, 
inevitably, something of a blunt tool, and more fine-grained analyses of 
individual operations are needed in order to assess the ‘performance’ of the 
formations involved. 
 
These considerations are borne in mind when re-evaluating the failed assault 
of 7 July. There is little doubt that any assault on the German position in 
Mametz Wood was considered to be very difficult, even before 115 Brigade’s 
travails. Sassoon, on 3 July, had worried that if ordered to attack the wood the 
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following day his battalion would ‘probably get cut up’.71 The official account of 
the attack by 12th Manchesters and 9th Duke of Wellington’s of 17th Division on 
Quadrangle Support Trench on 7 July argued that ‘in broad daylight the two 
battalions had no chance of reaching Quadrangle Support over bare and open 
ground,’ and 17th’s own history made similar criticisms, explicitly stating that 
no blame could be attached to the 38th for its failure to take the wood on 7 
July.72 
 
In order better to understand the failure of the attack on 7 July it is instructive 
to consider some recent military history writing on the British, French and 
German armies during the First World War. In an original and sophisticated 
work Leonard V. Smith uses Foucauldian theory to study the history of French 
5e Division d’Infanterie.73 Smith argues that ‘battlefield soldiers determined 
how they would and would not fight the war, and hence altered the 
parameters of command authority in accordance with their own perceived 
interests.’74 Rather than accept obedience to orders as a given, Smith 
contends that soldiers’ investment in attacks was calibrated, not every attack 
being pressed home with ‘equal vigour’ – ‘a gray area existed between 
command expectations and what soldiers in the trenches determined was 
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possible’, a ‘negotiated balance-of-power equation’.75 Smith introduces the 
concept of ‘proportionality’ – soldiers did not necessarily reject ‘the levels of 
offensive violence expected of them’, but they interpreted them according to 
their relevance to the ultimate goal of winning the war.76 This involved 
‘soldierly discretion’, and ‘calculations as to the utility of aggression’.77 
Obeying orders could have military utility, or it could lead to massacre – and 
soldiers made decisions as to how much they risked in any given situation.78 
Smith’s primary focus is on soldiers’ resistance, the ultimate expression of 
which was the 1917 mutinies, but his methodology is equally applicable to the 
‘live and let live’ system of trench warfare, and to any combat situation. His 
longitudinal study includes the offensives of autumn 1915, in which, he 
argues, soldiers of 5e Division attacked as planned, only to stop pushing 
forward once they felt nothing more could be gained. Their commanding 
officers had no alternative but to accept this as a sufficient effort.79 
 
Alexander Watson’s comparative study of morale in the British and German 
armies effectively adds to Smith’s insights with the argument that soldiers 
negotiated the horrendous danger of the front-line experience by developing 
appropriate risk-assessment strategies. These involved optimizing one’s 
estimation of danger so as to be able to recognize mortal threat, while at the 
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same time not allowing such assessments to result in panic, paralysis or 
mental collapse.80 This suggests that soldiers do not behave like automatons, 
slavishly following the orders issued by their superior officers, no matter the 
risk to themselves, but neither do they behave solely according to the 
imperatives of self-protection. Instead they do their best to behave according 
to their understanding of their role as combat fighters, without deliberately 
putting themselves in situations in which survival is highly unlikely. 
 
Understanding the assault of 7 July from the perspective of individual soldiers, 
what they were being asked to achieve was a physical and mental 
impossibility. Corps Commander Horne might state that ‘machine guns will not 
stop fresh troops if they mean to get in’, but that was nonsense given the 
hundreds of rounds per minute a single machine-gun could pour into attacking 
troop formations in broad daylight.81 And, as previously noted, the Germans 
had machine-guns not only in the Hammerhead but in Sabot and Flat Iron 
copses as well as in their second line on the Bazentin ridge. As Colin Hughes 
observes, ‘it would be difficult to imagine a more suicidal direction of attack 
than that chosen by XV Corps for the 115th Brigade’.82 
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Consequently some troops simply stopped when machine-gunned, and others 
turned back.83 ‘We just wilted’ wrote one survivor, when confronted by 
‘devastating’ MG fire.84 German artillery also proved to be accurate and 
horrifyingly effective. After the initial attack was halted Sergeant Perriman of 
11th SWB was detailed to lead his platoon back to Caterpillar Wood and 
thence to launch an attack on the German machine-gun posts that were 
causing so much havoc. ‘The German shelling on our position had intensified 
as to become a living hell’, wrote Perriman, and although the platoon moved 
off to attack both the officer commanding and then Perriman were hit by 
shrapnel, effectively decapitating the attack before it had an opportunity to be 
launched.85 Elsewhere, enemy snipers picked off Welsh officers, ensuring that 
on the ground leadership faltered, but even without this handicap it is difficult 
to imagine that any subsequent attack made under the same conditions could 
have stood a better chance.86 To have continued to attempt to advance would 
have been to throw one’s life away for no purpose – an action which would (in 
Smith’s and Watson’s terms) neither have been ‘proportional’ nor ‘risk-
optimized’. As it was, a consequence of 115 Brigade’s failure to press home 
against impossible odds was that, though mauled, its battalions were still in a 
fit enough state to support 113 and 114 Brigades on 10 and 11 July (when 
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11th SWB performed very creditably in reaching the north-east corner of the 
wood).  
 
What were the circumstances in which the assault of 7 July might have been 
successful? First, much better coordination of the attacks by proximate 
divisions would have been sensible. Instead isolated offensives went in, 
allowing the Germans the opportunity to concentrate artillery (and machine-
gun) fire and available reserves in one sector.87 Second, the plan of attack on 
7 July was unimaginative. To attack in daylight across open ground without 
any attempt to draw the fire from German machine-guns was to invite 
disaster. This was compounded by failure to provide adequate artillery 
support, both of any bombardment of German positions and of a 
smokescreen which might have given the advancing troops cover as they 
crossed open ground. The contrast with the employment of the creeping 
barrage on 10 July is noteworthy. For the artillery failure corps command must 
take the blame.88 Even had the two battalions in the front line managed to 
reach the Hammerhead it is still difficult to imagine that they would have 
succeeded in dislodging the German defenders. The attack needed to be 
made in much greater force by more than one brigade. 
 
The foregoing argument suggests that culpability for the failure of the 38th’s 
first offensive is to be found at a level no lower than that of the brigade: that 
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Brigadier-General Evans, his battalion commanders, and the officers and men 
of 115 Brigade did their best in extremely unpropitious conditions, suffering 
badly from others’ lack of planning, coordination, or appropriate provision of 
artillery support. However, in assessing the Mametz Wood action as a whole, 
there is no escaping the fact that the 38th did not perform optimally in July 
1916, and its failings may be categorised as those of leadership, and of the 
troops’ self-control. 
 
In terms of leadership, Major-General Philipps was clearly out of his depth as 
a divisional commander. He did not enjoy the confidence of XV Corps, nor did 
he do anything to justify such confidence.89 While he was at the helm 
divisional headquarters was little more than a staging post for messages 
passing between XV Corps and the three brigades under Philipps’s 
command. Philipps did not devise the plan for the first, disastrous attack on 
the wood on 7 July (that responsibility lies with Horne and XV Corps), but a 
more dynamic and professional divisional commander might have adjusted 
the plans in agreement with his superior. It is instructive to compare Philipps’s 
passivity with the approach of Major-General Pilcher of 17th Division, who 
repeatedly challenged what he regarded as futile orders that would result in 
slaughter for no appreciable gain. Although Pilcher, like Philipps, was to be 
sacked from his post before the end of July, he argued that more literal 
obedience on his part to XV Corps’ orders would have cost the lives of an 
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additional two to three thousand men.90 Pilcher was the longest serving 
divisional commander on the Somme at the beginning of the offensive, and 
the 17th had seen serious action at Hooge in August 1915 and near Ypres in 
February 1916, so he perhaps had a much firmer grasp of the situation and of 
what was possible in the circumstances.91 Philipps compounded his passivity 
on 7 July, and sealed his fate, by bungling the proposed night operation on 
8/9 July, Simkins terming the decision to entrust the task of securing the 
southern salient of the wood at night to a single platoon ‘extraordinary’.92 It is 
impossible to mount any convincing defence of his record, or of Lloyd 
George’s role in facilitating his appointment. 
 
The lower tiers of divisional command were not entirely unproblematic, 
although the general standard of leadership at brigade and battalion level was 
good, with Price-Davies, Marden and Evans deserving credit for crucial 
interventions and sensible decisions.93 At battalion level, Lieutenant-Colonel 
Carden of 16th RWF is praised by Hicks for his ‘suicidal bravery’, but it was 
not wise for him as commanding officer to advertize his presence to the 
enemy by tying a coloured handkerchief to his walking stick and waving it in 
an attempt to encourage his own men.94 The regimental historian chose his 
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words carefully in terming Carden ‘a gifted leader with a touch of fanaticism.’95 
Even before the attack was underway Carden caused confusion by failing to 
return to his battalion in time for the scheduled start-time, and eventually they 
left without him, eighteen minutes late. This delay ensured that 16th RWF did 
not benefit from any artillery barrage cover, and although Carden rejoined 
them shortly afterwards and played a part in stiffening their resolve to 
continue their advance, he was killed before he could lead his battalion into 
the wood.96 But Carden apart, and there is no doubting his personal courage, 
other battalion commanders performed staunchly in very difficult conditions. 
Junior officers frequently acquitted themselves well, although many became 
casualties in the initial assault on 10 July, which meant that some men were 
relatively leaderless once in the wood.97 And inevitably, the quality of officers 
varied, Hughes noting that 14th RWF ‘suffered more than any other battalion 
from lack of firm leadership.’98 Overall, a better divisional commander and 
officers who had had more time to become experienced in front-line combat 
would have made a positive difference to 38th’s performance in July 1916. 
 
The second major failing was that some of the troops evinced occasional 
erratic and panicky behaviour on 10 and 11 July. During the initial assault 
there is evidence that, in places, the attackers hesitated and retired. Some 
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‘thoroughly demoralised’ men of 14th RWF encountered before the wood was 
entered had to be threatened by revolver-wielding officers who ensured they 
regrouped and returned to the fray.99 Once in the wood conditions were so 
confused and resistance encountered so fierce that soldiers were sometimes 
panicked into momentary withdrawals. Captain Jones wrote of ‘perfect 
pandemonium’ in the wood on the evening of 10 July as ‘scores of men, from 
every battalion in the division’ exited the wood ‘all making headlong from the 
rear’ under ‘terrible enemy shelling’.100 Marden, in command of 114 Brigade in 
July 1916, refers to ‘a few men’ who ‘panicked down the central drive carrying 
with them at the southern outskirts of the wood several score of others who, 
officerless, had lost their way.’101 Such testimony is echoed by Emlyn Davies 
of 17th RWF who witnessed ‘numbers of our own men … trampling to the rear’ 
when caught by a short-falling British artillery barrage during the fighting 
sometime on 10 and 11 July, although an NCO rallied the troops with a 
stentorian ‘Stick It, Welsh!’102 Brigadier-General Price-Davies, writing 
immediately after the battle, noted that ‘a certain degree of demoralisation set 
in’ once the wood was reached, and ‘it was only by the utmost strenuous 
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efforts on the part of a few officers that it was possible to make progress.’ 
Most forcibly, he noted that: 
 
The demoralisation increased towards evening on the 10th and 
culminated in a disgraceful panic during which many left the wood 
whilst others seemed quite incapable of understanding, or unwilling to 
carry out the simplest order. A few stout-hearted German would have 
stampeded the whole of the troops in the wood.103 
 
Price-Davies later believed that, in general terms, he ‘may not have given my 
brigade full credit for what they did in Mametz Wood’, having been overly 
influenced ‘by the discreditable behaviour of the men of the division who fled 
in panic at about 8.45 pm on 10 July.’104 The key point here, however, is that 
there are multiple witnesses to what appears to have been an episode of 
large-scale collective flight late on 10 July. 
 
Putting this in context, it is worth noting that the 38th had been given no 
training in wood fighting, which was notoriously difficult, and should be 
excused some measure of blame for its failure to cope well with its exigencies 
at all times.105 The landscape was devastated, the trees often set alight, 
navigation and communication was very problematic, and disorientated troops 
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could find themselves isolated, surrounded, and sometimes captured.106 The 
Somme woods were ‘fearsome killing grounds’ which all presented British 
troops with major challenges.107 Seven attacks on Trônes Wood from 8 July 
failed and the wood did not fall until after the assault on the German second 
line, which left the Germans in the wood at risk of being isolated.108 Delville 
Wood held out for six weeks and High Wood for two months. In the 
circumstances the fact that the 38th took two days to take the largest wood on 
the Somme can hardly be taken seriously as a criticism. As Price-Davies 
noted, ‘well-trained fresh regulars would have found it hard on maneouvres 
even!’109 
 
This essay has argued that we should disconnect the evaluation of the 38th’s 
record at Mametz Wood from any responsibility for proving the martial valour 
of the Welsh nation, and at the same time consider the strengths and 
weaknesses of statistical measurements of battlefield performance. Drawing 
on the insights of a range of military histories, it has been suggested that the 
men and officers of the 38th (with some exceptions) performed as well as 
could have been expected in conditions of extreme stress and great danger, 
took a difficult objective following a sustained attack made in force by 113 and 
114 Brigades on 10 July, and were substantially reinforced by the men of 115 
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Brigade who had themselves been asked to attempt an impossible task on 7 
July. In different conditions, under different leaders, and with the experience 
of Mametz Wood behind it, the 38th (Welsh) Division was to go on to enjoy 
greater recognized success on the Western Front. 
